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Abstract  
We study the effects of municipal mergers using novel geocoded data on public 
sector jobs and local politicians’ place of residence. We find that municipal fiscal 
outcomes evolve in the same way on average in the merged municipalities as in 
the control group of hypothetical mergers that did not take place. However, these 
findings hide substantial heterogeneity within the mergers. The mergers led to 
highly unequal political representation between the merging municipalities. The 
municipalities that were politically marginalized in the post-merger council 
experience a substantial reduction in local public jobs in administration and 
health and social care sectors relative to the municipalities that were more 
strongly represented. 
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1 Introduction 
Policy-makers often see municipal mergers as an effective way of realizing economies of 
scale in municipal service provision. Other perceived benefits from larger local jurisdictions 
include the internalization of interjurisdictional spillovers and an increased fiscal capacity to 
sustain spending or revenue shocks. With these goals mind, municipal merger reforms have 
been implemented over time in a vast number of countries. For example, Blom-Hansen et al. 
(2016) report that since the 1950’s extensive merger reforms have taken place in 28 
developed countries.  
The optimal size of local jurisdictions has also been on the research agenda in 
economics and political science for decades. The take-away from this literature is more 
nuanced than that of the policy-makers. It is now well understood that the optimal size 
involves trade-offs as larger size may come with a number of offsetting costs. First, some 
interjurisdictional spillovers, such as yardstick competition, may actually be beneficial 
(Besley and Case 1995; Grossman et al. 2017). Second, multi-purpose jurisdictions, such as 
municipalities, produce many different public services and the optimal jurisdiction size varies 
across these different services (Miceli 1993). Increasing municipality size may facilitate 
economies of scale in one area, but at the cost of another. Moreover, service production takes 
place at the site level within the municipalities and realizing scale economies would require 
merging the production units, such as schools and health care centers, along with the 
municipalities (Blom-Hansen et al. 2016).  
Finally, as the size of the jurisdiction increases, the regional heterogeneity of the 
population increases as well, making it more difficult to tailor local services to match the 
preferences of the citizens (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Ellingsen 1998). The preference 
heterogeneity may be particularly important in municipal mergers due to sorting in the way 
described in Tiebout (1956). This concern is also closely tied to local politics. The regional 
political power may shift considerably due to a merger as some regions may become 
politically marginalized in the post-merger decision-making body. This shift may also have 
detrimental effects on the functioning of local democracy and voter participation, which may 
further exacerbate the uneven distribution of political power and municipal services within a 
merger (Verba and Nie 1972; Dahl and Tufte 1973; Oliver 2000; Treisman 2007; Lassen and 
Serritzlew 2011; Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2016). Earlier literature also suggests that political 
considerations reflecting regional heterogeneity have played a major role in the merger 
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reforms in different countries (Bhatti and Hansen 2011; Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2014; 
Hyytinen et al. 2014 and Bruns et al. 2015).  
We contribute to the small, but rapidly growing literature on the effects of municipal 
mergers (e.g. Reingewertz 2012; Allers and Geertsema 2016; Blom-Hansen et al. 2014 and 
Blom-Hansen et al. 2016) using data from a merger reform in Finland. The novel feature of 
our analysis is that we can use pre-merger municipality level data to analyze within-merger 
heterogeneity in the merger effects with respect to geographic political representation. We 
have access to detailed geocoded micro data (250 m x 250 m grids covering whole of Finland) 
on the location and number of jobs in public administration, schooling and health and social 
care. These data enable us to follow these outcomes at the pre-merger municipality level even 
when the official municipal statistics on municipal expenditures are produced only at the post-
merger municipality level after merging. To our knowledge, our study is the first to use data 
directly related to municipal service production at a more disaggregated level than the post-
merger municipalities.1  
This level of data aggregation also allows us to dig deeper into the political 
determinants of merger effects. In particular, we have data on the exact residential location of 
municipal councilors, which allows us to study how the merger effects depend on the political 
representation of pre-merger municipalities in the new post-merger municipal council. While 
the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of 
public funds has received substantial attention in prior literature (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 
2002; Knight 2008; Berry et al. 2010; Albouy 2013; Hodler and Raschky 2014 and Fiva and 
Halse 2016), the issue has eluded the research on municipal mergers. This is an important gap 
in the literature given that mergers typically have large impacts on the representation of 
different geographic voter groups (Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2016).  
The analysis of municipal merger effects comes with a number of methodological 
challenges. The Finnish mergers were voluntarily decided by municipality councils at the 
local level. This of course makes causal inference challenging due to possible selection bias. 
However, the voluntary nature of the mergers is a blessing in disguise because it allows us to 
construct a sensible control group. Often in the case of forced mergers the central government 
imposes a minimum population threshold that all municipalities need to fulfill through 
                                                 
1 Egger et al. (2017) use night-light data to analyze changes in the overall economic activity within German 
mergers.  
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merging.2 While it is in some sense true that forcing all municipalities below a given 
threshold to merge rules out selection bias, it does so by effectively washing away the entire 
relevant control group. In this case, the treatment group (small municipalities that were forced 
to merge) is very different from the control group (large municipalities that did not have to 
merge) by construction.  
To address the endogeneity issue, we combine nearest neighbor matching with 
difference-in-differences (DID) methods. While these are well-established methods for causal 
inference, they need to be adjusted for the merger analysis because there are at least two 
partners in each merger (in our case up to ten partners). The causal effect we are after is the 
difference in the development of the outcome of interest when a group of municipalities 
merge and the counterfactual when they do not. This means that the relevant comparison 
should be made between a group of municipalities that merged (treatment group) and a group 
with the same number of municipalities with similar characteristics that did not merge 
(control group).  
We construct this control group by first simulating all possible mergers involving up to 
ten municipalities (ten being the largest actual merger) that could have taken place according 
to the pre-merger municipality borders. We constrain these hypothetical mergers so that (i) we 
only allow mergers to take place between adjacent municipalities, which guarantees that the 
hypothetical new municipality is geographically contiguous, (ii) we allow mergers to take 
place only within county borders because none of the actual mergers crossed these borders, 
and (iii) we omit those hypothetical mergers that included at least one municipality that 
actually underwent a merger. We then build the control group from this universe of 
hypothetical mergers using nonparametric nearest neighbor matching based on merger level 
characteristic measured before the mergers took place. We use this control group also in the 
pre-merger municipality level analysis where we decompose the mergers in the control group 
to the municipality level.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows. After merging, total municipal 
expenditures evolve in the same way on average in merged municipalities as in the control 
group of hypothetical mergers that did not take place. These zero findings are consistent with 
                                                 
2 For example, in the Danish 2007 reform analyzed by Blom-Hansen et al. (2014) and Blom-Hansen et al. (2016) 
basically all municipalities with a population below 20,000 merged (compliance rate was 98 percent). Similar 
population thresholds set by the central government were used during the Swedish (Hinnerich 2009) and the 
German (Blesse and Baskaran 2016) merger reforms among others. 
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prior evidence concerning voluntary mergers (Moisio and Uusitalo 2013; Allers and 
Geertsema 2016; Baskaran and Blesse 2016). However, these merger level findings hide 
substantial heterogeneity within the mergers. In particular, while nothing happened to the  
number of jobs in schooling, the number of local public jobs in administration and in the 
health and social care sector decrease substantially in the politically marginalized (pre-merger 
level) municipalities relative to those municipalities that were more strongly represented in 
the post-merger municipal council. In fact, the jobs in the latter two sectors increased 
somewhat in these politically stronger municipalities. We also detect divergence in house 
prices between the politically marginalized municipalities and the municipalities with more 
representation, which suggests that the quality of the service-tax bundle deteriorated in the 
smaller merger partners. However, we lack reliable data on the development house prices in 
some of the smallest merged municipalities due to low number of transactions. This means 
that these results are less reliable than the results concerning the number of local public sector 
jobs and should be interpreted cautiously. 
We subject the results to a number of validity checks, including placebo tests. Most 
importantly, we are able to show long common pre-treatment trends for the control and the 
merger groups and also within the merger group based on political representation for our main 
outcomes of interest. This offers strong, although indirect, support for the common trends 
assumption, which is crucial for a causal interpretation of the DID results. We also show that 
in the small municipalities that did not merge the number of local public jobs do not exhibit 
similar changes as in the small municipalities that merged and that these groups had common 
pre-treatment trends in these outcomes. This suggests that the heterogeneous effects within 
the mergers can be attributed to mergers and to differences in local political representation.  
Compared to prior literature, our results paint a much more nuanced picture of what 
happens to municipal services when municipal boundaries are redrawn and which voter 
groups are affected the most. The results suggest that local political representation and the 
details of the local electoral system should have a larger role in the planning and evaluation of 
major merger reforms. We elaborate on the implications of our findings in more detail in the 
conclusions.  
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2 Institutional background 
2.1 Finnish municipalities 
Municipal tasks: Finland has a two-tier system of government consisting of the central 
government and municipalities as the local level.3 Municipalities have extensive tasks and 
fiscal autonomy. In addition to local public goods and services, municipalities are responsible 
for providing most of social and health care services along with primary and secondary 
schooling. This makes municipalities of considerable importance to the whole economy. The 
GDP share of municipality spending is roughly 18 percent and they employ around 20 percent 
of the total workforce.  
Revenue sources: The most important revenue sources are local taxes and operating 
revenues, such as fees. The most important tax instrument is the local income tax. The tax rate 
is flat and the municipalities can set the level freely. The property tax is of much less 
importance and municipalities can set the property tax rates only within limits set by the 
central government. The corporate income tax is a state level tax, but municipalities receive a 
share of the tax revenue based on profits and employment of firms within their borders. In 
2012, the average share of the income tax of total revenue was 46 percent, while the shares of 
the property and corporate taxes were only 3 percent, respectively. 
Regional tax base and cost disparities are offset by a central government grant system. 
The system is based on estimates of average costs and tax bases so that municipalities have 
very limited possibilities to influence the amount of grants that they receive. The grant system 
covers about 20 percent of total municipal revenues, but this share varies considerably from 
one municipality to another.  
Municipal politics: Finland has a proportional representation (PR) system with eight 
parties that dominate national and municipal politics. Municipal councils are the main seat of 
power in the municipal decision making. The council term lasts for four years starting from 
January after the elections. Only permanent residents of a municipality can vote or run for a 
council seat. During our analysis period, the council size was a step function of population 
and varied between 13 and 85.4 The merged municipalities were allowed to have a larger 
council size than the law dictated for the first post-merger election term. Each municipality 
                                                 
3 Technically, there is a middle-tier consisting of counties. However, counties do not have major tasks and do not 
have elected officials.   
4 In 2017, the law concerning council size was slightly changed. 
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has only one electoral district (i.e. constituency) and no geographic quotas are in place, even 
after a merger. 
The municipal elections use an open-list method. Voting for a single individual 
candidate is mandatory. Party vote is calculated as the sum over its candidates’ votes. Council 
seats are allocated to parties based on the party vote shares in accordance with competitive 
indices set by the d’Hondt method. Personal votes determine the position of the candidates 
within the party list. The elections in October 2008 already used the new post-merger 
municipal division, although the mergers came to effect at the start of 2009.  
Parties do not typically form stable ruling coalitions in municipal councils. Instead, 
majority coalitions are often formed issue by issue. Moreover, party discipline is less strict at 
the local level than in the national parliament (see e.g. Hyytinen et al. 2014). In this 
environment, regional political representation can play a role in municipal decision making 
either directly through coalition formation across party lines or by influencing within party 
positions (see Baron and Ferejohn 1989 and Laver and Shepsle 1990). In the former case, the 
councilors from the same pre-merger municipality would vote in the council as a coalition 
that is independent of the formal parties and the councilors’ own party affiliation. In the latter 
case, the regional political representation within the parties may affect the policy position of 
the parties. In both situations, having more councilors from their home (pre-merger) 
municipality should be beneficial to voters.  
 
2.2 The merger reform 
In 2005, the central government initiated a plan that aimed at reforming the municipal 
revenue structure and more importantly making the production of statutory municipal services 
more efficient. The reasons behind the reform included aging related expected increases in 
municipal spending and disparities in municipal revenue bases due to urbanization. A 
provisional law enacted in 2007 states that municipalities should have strong enough revenue 
and labor force bases to cope with the production of statutory municipal services. Municipal 
mergers were the main tool for reaching these goals. The municipalities were allowed to 
decide voluntarily whether and with whom to merge.  
The central government encouraged mergers using four policy instruments. First, 
central government grants were guaranteed not to decrease for the first five years after 
merging. Second, municipalities were not allowed to lay off their permanent employees 
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during the first five post-merger years. The central government did not, however, enforce 
additional restrictions on the merging municipalities concerning how they handle their 
finances before the mergers take place (Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2015). Third, the central 
government granted merger subsidies to merged municipalities. The subsidy amount 
depended on the populations of the pre-merger municipalities, the population of the resulting 
new municipality and the number of participating municipalities in the merger. The mergers 
in 2008 and 2009 received larger subsidies than the subsequent ones, possibly explaining why 
most mergers took place in 2009. The subsidies were paid in annual installments over a three 
year period after the mergers had taken place. On average over the merged municipalities, the 
merger subsidy was about 330 Euros per capita, but in some mergers the per capita subsidy 
was as high as 1100 Euros.  
The merger process itself is as follows. The process usually starts with unofficial 
discussions which may lead to an initial feasibility study that is conducted by an external 
consultant. Based on the consultant’s report, municipal boards make a proposal of the merger 
to the municipal councils. This proposal is then voted on by the councils. If the proposed 
merger gains a majority in all the participating councils, the merger goes through. If not, it is 
cancelled and all the municipalities continue as they were or a subset of the municipalities in 
the original plan merges. The process from the consultancy report to the final merger decision 
can take up to two years.  
In 2006, there were 431 municipalities in total. Following the central government plan, 
14 mergers took place in 2007, 1 in 2008 and 32 in 2009. This reduced the number of 
municipalities to 348 (see Fig. 1). The number of municipalities involved in a given merger 
ranged from 2 to 10 municipalities. 
We concentrate on the mergers that took place in 2009, which are highlighted in the 
map in Fig. 1. We exclude three of the 32 mergers that took place in 2009 from our analysis 
because they were part of another merger just before or just after 2009. We focus on the 2009 
mergers, because for them the 2008 elections take place before any potential merger effects 
materialize. For the 2007 mergers, an explanatory variable based on the 2008 elections could 
potentially suffer from a bad control issue (see e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009). Moreover, 
focusing only on the 2009 mergers allows for a transparent graphical presentation of our 
results. Finally, the central government merger incentives scheme is different for 2009 
mergers than the previous and subsequent ones. 
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municipalities that either merged (treatment group) or a group that did not merge (control 
group). The key issue for our analysis is constructing a valid control group.  
We construct this control group by first simulating all possible mergers involving up to 
ten municipalities that could have taken place according to the pre-merger municipality 
borders.5 We constrain these hypothetical mergers in the following ways: First, we only allow 
mergers to take place between adjacent municipalities, i.e. the hypothetical new municipality 
has to be geographically contiguous. Second, we allow mergers to take place only within 
county borders because none of the actual mergers crossed these borders (see Fig. 1).6 Finally, 
to make sure there is no contamination of the control group, we omit from this set of 
hypothetical mergers all those mergers that included at least one municipality that actually 
underwent a merger in the period 2005–2015.  
After these sample restrictions, we are left with a total of 7,965 hypothetical mergers 
(see Table A1).7 We then use a nearest neighbor matching algorithm based on merger level 
characteristic from the pre-merger period to find suitable controls for the actual mergers.8 We 
use exact matching with respect to number of municipalities in the merger. For example, for a 
merger including, say, four municipalities we pick five control mergers among those 
hypothetical mergers that also include four municipalities.9 Within these merger size groups, 
the matching is based on the following covariates: total population of the merger, median 
distance of the citizens to the business center of the largest municipality in the merger, 
indicator for whether all the partners belong to the same health care cooperation unit, and 
within-merger heterogeneity in per capita taxable income, expenditures and deficit. These 
variables should reflect the potential for economies of scale, and the differences between 
                                                 
5 We use the FANMOD software by Wernicke (2006) to construct the potential mergers with 2–6 partners. For 
the larger mergers we resort to using the ISMAGS software produced by Houbraken et al. (2014). 
6 We also omit the counties of Kainuu and Lapland, which are highlighted in the map in Fig. 1. Kainuu was 
experimenting with a new county level administration of health and social care services during the merger wave. 
Lapland, on the other hand, is an outlier with geographically large and sparsely populated municipalities. There 
were no mergers in these counties in 2009. 
7 All of these mergers would not be possible simultaneously in reality because an individual municipality may be 
involved in more than one of them.   
8 We use the teffects nnmatch command in STATA where the matches are sampled with replacement. We use 
the command only to construct the control group and do not use it in the estimation as we rely on DID 
estimation, want to allow for heterogeneity in the treatment effect and also analyze the effects at the pre-merger 
municipality level. The other commonly used matching method is propensity score matching, but it cannot 
facilitate exact matches in a subset of covariates and has also received some critique recently in King and 
Nielsen (2016). 
9 The choice of the number of control units is arbitrary and driven by the somewhat limited number of treated 
units. The optimal number of controls involves a standard bias-variance trade-off: Fewer controls means that 
they are more similar to the actual mergers, but this may lead to imprecise estimates. We can test the similarity 
of the control and treatment groups both in terms of pre-treatment levels and pre-treatment trends.  
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citizen’s preferences and the financial situation of the municipalities in a merger. Moreover, 
Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) found that most of these variables had predictive power in 
explaining these merger decisions.  
We use this control group, instead of all non-merged municipalities, also in the pre-
merger municipality level analysis, in which we simply decompose the hypothetical mergers 
back to the municipality level. This has the advantage of allowing us to conduct placebo tests 
using this group. Furthermore, matching on pre-determined variables is the only way to 
control for systematic differences in observables, because we cannot measure these variables 
at the pre-merger municipality level after merging. Matching on pre-determined variables also 
minimizes the risk of including bad controls (or alternative outcomes) into the right-hand-side 
of the regressions (e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
 
3.2 Data 
Merger level: Table 1 presents descriptive pre-merger statistics on the mergers and the 
control group based on nearest neighbor matching. The potential mergers in the control group 
are slightly larger in terms of total population than the actual mergers. Otherwise the 
matching algorithm produces a very comparable control group in terms of pre-merger 
characteristics. The magnitude of the mean differences is small and none of them are 
statistically significant.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for merger level data in 2008. 
  Merger = 0 Merger = 1 
p-value   Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Number of observations 145 29   
Number of municipalities 3.17 1.75 3.17 1.77   
Merger population 43,996 35,885 36,043 35,378 0.276 
Median distance (km) 18.9 9.2 17.4 9.9 0.431 
Expenditures (€ per capita) 5,175 491 5,334 545 0.121 
Operating margin (€ per capita) -4,206 289 -4,261 391 0.381 
Tax rate (%) 19.2 0.6 19.2 0.8 0.865 
Taxable income (€ per capita) 12,681 1,877 13,151 1,756 0.215 
Central government grants (€ per capita) 1,620 533 1,471 586 0.178 
Cooperation (0/1) 0.41 0.49 0.45 0.51 0.733 
Merger subsidy (€ per capita) 279.4 167.3 329.1 223.6 0.170 
Log house prices (€/m2) 7.11 0.24 7.16 0.24 0.292 
Note: The data come from Statistics Finland. The last column reports the p-value from a t-test on the equality of 
means. For house prices, the number of observations is 132 and 27, respectively. 
 
Pre-merger municipality level: In addition to merger level effects, we are interested in 
within merger heterogeneity and whether the effects depend on the political representation in 
the post-merger councils. This analysis is made possible by high quality GIS data that allows 
us to aggregate spatial micro data to match the pre-merger municipality borders. These data 
come from three sources.  
First, we have obtained the exact address of all the municipal councilors (and candidates 
in municipal elections) from the Population Register Center. These data allow us to calculate 
the seat shares at the pre-merger municipality level in the post-merger municipal councils, 
which we use as a treatment variable.  
Second, we use the Community Structure Database (YKR) produced by the Finnish 
Environment Institute (SYKE) and Statistics Finland. This geocoded database covers the 
whole of Finland in 250 m x 250 m grids, which include information on the number of jobs in 
different sectors located in the grids. The data are available for the years 2000, 2003, 2005, 
2007, 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2014. They allow us to analyze the development of these jobs 
through time regardless of the redrawing of municipal borders. Unfortunately, we cannot 
categorize the jobs into municipal and other jobs, and we need to rely on the categorization 
available in the data. We use the following four job categories: public administration and 
defense, health and social care, schooling, and employees from all other sectors. The first 
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three categories are our main job outcomes while the latter can be used in placebo tests 
because mergers should not have a sizable direct effect on these jobs, although an indirect 
effect is possible. Schooling and health and social care are the most important expenditure 
and employment categories as they make up some 70 percent of all municipal expenditures.   
The problem with these categories is that some of these jobs may, in fact, be in the 
private sector (especially in health care) or in central government (obviously defense, but also 
some schooling because of universities). These jobs should not, however, confound our 
analysis as long as there are no changes in these jobs that coincide with the timing of the 
mergers. In practice this means that jobs in the military, private sector health care firms and in 
universities need to develop smoothly through the merger reform. If this is the case, the DID 
strategy produces a causal effect on municipal jobs, i.e. any changes in the number of these 
jobs can quite safely be interpreted as changes in municipal jobs.10 
Finally, we use house transaction data at the zip-code level obtained from Statistics 
Finland. As zip-codes remain unchanged throughout the merger process, we can follow 
average house prices per square meter at the pre-merger municipality level. House prices are 
often used as an indirect measure of the quality of the service-tax bundle.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for these variables using the matched data at the 
pre-merger municipality level. The municipalities are divided into four groups for illustrative 
purposes. First is the control of group municipalities that did not merge. Second, since our 
interest lies on the effects of political representation, we have divided the merged 
municipalities into three equal-sized groups based on the council seat share they obtained in 
the first post-merger elections in 2008.11 As Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2016) describe in detail, 
in the Finnish open-list system, candidates from smaller merger partners have to compete with 
candidates from the larger partners within the party lists. This means that very small merged 
                                                 
10 In order to be on the safe side, we have also interviewed management from the two leading private sector 
heath care providers in Finland: Terveystalo (Päivi Metsäniemi, Chief physician) and Attendo Finland (Lauri 
Korkeaoja, Director of Communications and PR). They communicated to us that the location decisions by their 
firms have been independent of the municipal mergers and mostly independent of public sector providers’ 
decisions more generally. Some of their activities may follow municipal activities because the municipal sector 
buys radiology and diagnostic services from the private sector, but here the location decision only takes place 
conditional on the public sector response. Furthermore, private sector operators sometimes find the space 
abandoned by the public sector convenient, thus possibly leading to a small amount of under-estimation of the 
effects on our part. 
11 The second post-merger elections were held in 2012. The correlation between pre-merger municipal level seat 
shares between the first and second post-merger elections is very high at 0.98, so we use the first post-merger 
election results throughout our analysis. Moreover, the 2012 elections could be influenced by the mergers, and 
thus, the 2012 election results perhaps better serve as an alternative outcome rather than a treatment.  
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municipalities have difficulties in getting any local representatives into post-merger councils. 
These groups are used in the graphical analyses; whereas the continuous seat share variable is 
used in the subsequent DID regressions. 
The Weak group in Table 2 includes the municipalities with only a weak representation 
in the new council with an average seat share of only 6.4 percent. In the Medium group the 
average seat share is 20.8, while in the Strong group this share is 62.9 percent on average. In 
fact, 75 percent of the municipalities in the Strong group had a majority of the council seats. 
We cannot divide the control group into these subgroups, because they obviously have not 
had joint post-merger elections. However, we conduct placebo analysis using this group, 
where we use municipal population shares as proxies for seat shares.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for pre-merger municipality level data in 2007. 
  No merger Weak Medium Strong 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean  SD 
Number of observations 460 31 31 30 
Seat share in post-merger council 1.000 0.000 0.064 0.031 0.224 0.079 0.669 0.163 
Population 10,750 15,372 2,424 1,946 7,467 8,417 24,419 28,561
Population share in merger 0.257 0.211 0.054 0.032 0.209 0.077 0.695 0.187 
Jobs per capita:                 
Administration and defense 0.013 0.016 0.008 0.005 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.011 
Schooling 0.023 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.021 0.013 0.029 0.012 
Health and social care 0.050 0.018 0.043 0.022 0.047 0.020 0.067 0.022 
Other  0.232 0.074 0.168 0.043 0.219 0.076 0.274 0.076 
Notes: The Weak, Medium and Strong representation groups are constructed based on the pre-merger 
municipality level seat shares in the first post-merger municipal elections. 
 
3.3 Difference-in-differences estimation 
In addition to using a matching algorithm in constructing the control group, our 
identification strategy is based on the difference-in-differences method, where a control group 
of hypothetical mergers (or non-merging municipalities) is compared to actual mergers (or 
merged municipalities) before and after a treatment has taken place. In presenting our results, 
we will rely heavily on graphical evidence, but we will also report regression results to assess 
the statistical significance of the results.  
When using the merger level data, we estimate the following type of DID models:  
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where y is one of our outcomes of interest in merger i at time t. θt are year dummies. We are 
interested in the coefficients of the post-merger interaction terms merger·year.  
The model using pre-merger municipal level data and the seat shares takes the form: 
 
 
2014
2009
2014
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j
y merger seatshare merger year
merger seatshare year u
α θ β γ δ
μ
=
=
= + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ +


  (2) 
 
where the coefficients μ now captures any heterogeneous effects with respect to political 
representation. Note that the council seat share measure is defined only for the municipalities 
that actually merged and is set to zero to non-merged municipalities. Thus, we do not include 
the term i iseatshare merger⋅  or the terms 
2014
2009 i jj
seatshare year
=
⋅ .  
The key concern is that selection issues may relate both to the decision to merge and to 
the extent of political representation within mergers. However, selection based on pre-
treatment differences in municipality characteristics does not bias the DID estimates as long 
as the common trends assumption holds. This assumption means that the outcomes would 
follow the same time trend in the control and treatment groups in the absence of treatment. 
We can indirectly test this assumption by analyzing pre-treatment trends using several 
comparisons: between mergers and non-mergers at the merger level, within mergers with 
respect to political representation at the pre-merger municipality level and between merged 
and non-merged of similar size at the pre-merger municipality level.  
In the municipality-level analysis, we use two-way clustered (municipality and merger) 
standard errors to account for within merger and municipality level dependencies across time 
and within the control group (see Bertrand et al. 2004 and Cameron et al. 2011). The within 
control group dependency arises naturally in our setting, because of the nearest neighbor 
matching was done with replacement. In the merger-level analysis, clustering is at the merger 
level. 
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4 Empirical results 
4.1 Merger level 
To facilitate comparison with the existing literature and to understand the overall 
average effects of the merger reform, we first report the results of the merger level analysis. 
We begin by presenting graphical evidence. This also allows us to assess (indirectly) the 
common trends assumption, which is crucial for a causal interpretation of the results.  
Fig. 2 presents the development of the means of per capita expenditures, operating 
margins12, tax rates and log house prices per square meter from 2000 to 2014. The 
comparison is between the actual mergers and the control group of hypothetical mergers 
based on nearest neighbor matching. The blue vertical lines highlight the post-merger period 
and the red vertical lines highlight when the 5-year layoff protection for municipal employees 
ended after the mergers, as we also want to understand whether removing this constraint 
affected the municipalities’ opportunities to cut expenditures.  
Based on visual inspection, the two groups clearly follow a common pre-treatment trend 
in all outcomes. Formal tests presented in Table A2 in the supporting information, support 
this claim, especially after 2003. Moreover, the levels are almost identical due to our 
matching procedure. Did the mergers have an effect on per capita expenditures? According to 
Fig. 2 the answer seems to be no. There is no immediate change in expenditures after merging 
or the subsequent six years. If anything, expenditures increase slightly faster in the merger 
group.13 There does not seem to be any effect on operating margin either. The regression 
results in Table 3 confirm that the differences are not statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
12 We use operating margin as our alternative measure of municipal expenditures because some municipalities 
produce and sell services to other municipalities, which adds noise to the expenditure measure. These services 
show up on the municipality’s expenditure side, but they also receive operating revenue from the sale of these 
services that needs to be netted-out. Operating margin measures the difference between operating revenues (such 
as fees) and operating costs. So in effect, it measures the expenditures that the municipality finances through 
taxes and central government grants.  
13 The small increase in expenditures in 2008, also detected in Table A2 in the supporting information, may be 
due to common pool exploitation reported in Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015) who studied the anticipatory effects 
of the same merger reform. 
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Fig. 2. Graphical DID results with merger level data. 
Note: The non-merged control group is constructed using nearest neighbor matching algorithm 
 
Interestingly, there is a small but temporary drop in tax rates in the merger group. One 
interpretation is that this is due to tax rate harmonization within a merger. However, we do 
not wish to draw too strong conclusions regarding the tax rates as the effects are not 
statistically significant according to Table 3. 
Based on the fiscal outcomes, it seems that the main goal of the policy-maker was not 
achieved.14 However, the fact that we do not find effects on expenditures does not necessarily 
mean that mergers had no effect on citizens’ welfare. It could be, for example, that merged 
municipalities are able to produce higher quality services with the same expenditures than the 
municipalities that did not merge. Unfortunately, we do not have good data on service quality, 
and instead, we need to use indirect measures of the quality of the service-tax bundle. An 
often used measure for this purpose is house prices (Reingewertz 2012; Allers and Geertsema 
2016). The idea is based on a revealed preference argument so that changes in quality of the 
service-tax bundle should be reflected in the demand for housing in the municipality and in 
                                                 
14 We also analyzed between merger heterogeneity with respect to the number of municipalities in a merger, pre-
merger cooperation among the merging municipalities and geographic compactness of the merger. Again, we 
found no effects with respect to these merger subgroups. These results are available from the authors by request.  
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house prices in the short run. Based on Fig. 2, house prices diverge slightly between the two 
groups, but the results in Table 3 indicate that the difference is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, some divergence seems to begin already prior to merging.  
 
Table 3. Regression DID results with merger level data. 
  Expenditures
Operating 
margin Tax rate House price 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Constant 3313.1** -2664.1** 18.31** 6.749** 
  [31.3] [18.7]    [0.053] [0.017]    
Merger 86.2 -6.9 -0.086 0.038 
  [86.8] [62.4]    [0.116] [0.043]    
Merger*2009 132.7 87.9** -0.267 0.028   
  [99.4] [32.1]    [0.221] [0.016]    
Merger*2010 174.8 30.2 -0.115 0.033   
  [117.5] [36.2]    [0.199] [0.019]    
Merger*2011 152.5 27.9 -0.175 0.039   
  [125.4] [41.1]    [0.199] [0.023]    
Merger*2012 162.1 -58.1 -0.169 0.039 
  [138.5] [47.7]    [0.209] [0.027]    
Merger*2013 38.1 -6.4 -0.27 0.027 
  [142.5] [58.6]    [0.206] [0.025]    
Merger*2014 89.2 -147.2 -0.037 0.031 
  [142.3] [90.5]    [0.257] [0.025]    
R2 0.74 0.84 0.59 0.34 
N  2610 2610 2490 2385 
Notes: The results are from OLS models. The non-merged control group is constructed using nearest neighbor 
matching algorithm. All the models include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the merger level and 
reported in brackets. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
 
4.2 Pre-merger municipality level 
The merger level analysis abstracts away from a number of interesting questions with 
respect to within-merger heterogeneity. For example, the services may be relocated to the 
largest municipality in the merger, but the overall service level, and thus, the expenditure 
level may remain the same. This may hurt the citizens in the smaller partner, but we would 
not be able to detect these relocations from the merger level data.  
In this section, we use pre-merger level municipalities in the analysis and ask whether 
the effects of mergers vary across municipalities and whether they depend on political 
representation. In order to assess the results visually, we divide the merged municipalities into 
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subgroups based on the (pre-merger) municipality level representation in the post-merger 
council as described in Table 2. The results are portrayed in Fig. 3, while Table 4 presents the 
corresponding regression results where the post-merger seat shares are used as a continuous 
treatment variable in a DID model presented in Eq. (2). Because of large differences in the 
number of total jobs, all the jobs measured in per capita terms.15  
Fig. 3 also includes placebo tests using the municipalities in the control group. Since we 
do not have merger level elections for these municipalities, we divide the control group into 
subgroups based on their population share in their hypothetical merger. We divide the control 
group into three equal sized groups based on the population share and label these subgroups 
the same way as the merger subgroups (Weak, Medium and Strong) so that the Strong group 
again includes the municipalities with the largest population share in their hypothetical 
merger.  
According to Fig. 3, administrative jobs (top-left) clearly decrease in the municipalities 
with Weak and Medium representation in the council, whereas they slightly increase in the 
municipalities with Strong representation. This suggests that municipal administration is 
concentrated to the largest municipality in the merger. For administration, pre-treatment 
common trends are not particularly clean, but the formal pre-treatment tests do not indicate a 
problem (see Table A3 in supporting information) and the largest changes clearly coincide 
with the mergers and these changes seem to be permanent. Furthermore, there are no changes 
in administrative jobs in the control group or in the subgroups that would coincide with the 
merger reform (top-right in Fig. 3).   
A similar pattern is evident in the health and social care sector jobs (middle-left in Fig. 
3). These jobs clearly decrease in the Medium and especially the Weak representation group, 
while there is no visible change in the Strong group. The initial reduction is substantial and 
the divergence between the groups permanent. The common trends assumption seems quite 
plausible for this outcome based on the pre-treatment trends and formal tests (see Table A3 in 
supporting information). Moreover, these jobs develop smoothly throughout the analysis 
period in each of the population share subgroups in the control group (middle-right in Fig. 3).  
There seem to be no permanent effects in the schooling sector (bottom-left in Fig. 3). 
After a small initial decline, the number of jobs quickly returns to the pre-merger levels and 
the groups do not diverge permanently. Formal pre-treatment tests do not indicate any 
                                                 
15 The results are not driven by changes in population levels in the municipalities are they develop smoothly in 
all the municipality groups (Fig. A1 in the supporting information). 
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problems (see Table A3 in supporting information) and these jobs develop smoothly also in 
the control group (bottom-right in Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Graphical DID results with pre-merger municipality level data.  
Notes: The left-hand side figures illustrate the true treatment effects based on municipal seat shares in the post-
merger councils. The right-hand side figures illustrate the placebo treatments for the non-merged control group 
based on municipal population shares. The non-merged control group is constructed using nearest neighbor 
matching algorithm. 
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The regression results presented in Table 4 are in line with the graphical findings.16 The 
effects on administration and health and social care are substantial, persistent and also 
statistically highly significant. For example, based on the regression results, in the first post-
merger year 2009 the health and social care jobs decrease by almost a third on average for the 
municipalities in the Weak representation group (seat share equal to 6.4 percent on average) 
compared to 2007. The interpretation of the regression coefficients for Seat share is 
somewhat tricky because the treatment effect may be a combination of overall reductions in 
the number of jobs and a reshuffling of jobs within the mergers from politically marginalized 
municipalities to the larger ones. Thus, Fig. 3 and Table 4, give a correct picture of the 
availability of services at municipality level, but do not say anything about the total number of 
jobs.  
In order to check, which the correct interpretation is, we calculated the number of total 
jobs in the merged municipalities before and after the mergers. The total number of health and 
social care jobs in the merged municipalities was 74,479 in 2007 and 74,329 in 2009. This 
suggests that the results are mostly due to reshuffling of these jobs from politically 
marginalized municipalities to the larger ones within the mergers. This is also in line with the 
zero effects on total expenditures. A plausible explanation is that some small local health care 
centers are closed and the employees are moved to health care centers in the municipality with 
more representation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Estimating these models using only the merged municipalities and omitting the merger-dummy and its 
interactions with the year-dummies produces the same the point estimates for the Seat share and year interaction 
terms. 
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Table 4. Regression DID results with pre-merger municipality level data. 
  Administration Schooling 
Health and 
social care 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Constant -0.001 -0.001 0.005 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.007] 
Merger 0.010** 0.013** 0.027** 
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.006] 
Seat share 0.011** 0.022** 0.037** 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.007] 
Merger*2009 -0.008** -0.006** -0.014** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
Merger*2010 -0.007** -0.001 -0.010** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] 
Merger*2012 -0.007** -0.001 -0.011** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] 
Merger*2014 -0.007** -0.001 -0.010** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] 
Seat share*2009 0.016** 0.006* 0.029** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] 
Seat share*2010 0.014** 0 0.021** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] 
Seat share*2012 0.016** 0.003 0.025** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] 
Seat share*2014 0.015** 0.002 0.026** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] 
R2 0.03 0.07 0.1 
N  4400 4400 4400 
Notes: The results are from OLS models. The non-merged control group is constructed using nearest neighbor 
matching algorithm All the models include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the merger and 
municipality level and reported in brackets. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
4.3 Discussion and validity checks 
Effects on welfare. The findings in Fig. 3 and Table 4 beg the question of whether the 
mergers were detrimental to the welfare of the residents in the politically marginalized 
municipalities that experienced reductions in health and social care services. To answer this 
question, we would ultimately need to know what happened to the overall quality of the 
bundle of municipal services and taxes in these municipalities.  
Unfortunately, we do not have data on overall service quality so we again turn to house 
prices as a proxy measure. The problem in using house price data at the pre-merger 
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municipality level is that the number of housing transactions per year is small in the smallest 
municipalities. Having only a few housing transactions in a given year would not give us a 
reliable measure of the quality of life in the municipality. In order to get reliable results, we 
have constrained the sample so that a municipality needs to have at least ten transactions per 
year during the whole 2000–2014 period to be included in the analysis. This means that for 
the visual inspection of the development of house prices we have to combine the Medium and 
Weak representation groups. The combined Medium and Weak group contains 20 
municipalities in total (16 Medium and 4 Weak). While the results are more reliable, this has 
the clear disadvantage that we effectively drop many of the municipalities that had the largest 
reductions in health and social care jobs.  
Fig. 4 presents the development of house prices (log price per square meter) in the 
representation subgroups and the population share subgroups of the control group. Table A4 
in the supporting information reports the corresponding regression results. From the left panel 
of Fig. 4, it is evident that house prices follow a rather clean pre-treatment common trend, 
which is also confirmed by formal pre-treatment tests (see Table A5 in supporting 
information). After merging house prices diverge between the Strong and the combined group 
of Medium and Weak representation municipalities. The combined Medium and Weak group 
diverges also from the control group from 2012 onwards. The differences are statistically 
significant for 2013 and 2014 as can be seen from Table A4 in the supporting information. At 
face value, this result means that the mergers were, at least to some extent, harmful to the 
residents in the politically marginalized municipalities. 
The population share subgroups exhibit common pre-treatment trends (see Table A5 in 
supporting information) and develop quite similarly also after the merger reform. The groups 
diverge slightly in the last year, but the DID estimates is not statistically significant (see Table 
A4 in supporting information). However, this finding together with the small number of 
transactions from the Weak representation group implies that we should treat these results and 
their interpretation with respect welfare with some caution.  
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Fig. 4. House prices at pre-merger municipality level. 
Note:  The left-hand side figure illustrates the true treatment effects based on municipal seat shares in the post-
merger councils. The right-hand side figure illustrates the placebo treatments for the non-merged control group 
based on municipal population shares. The non-merged control group is based on nearest neighbor matching 
algorithm. Due to small number of observations in the Weak representation group, Medium and Weak groups 
are combined in the figure. 
 
Validity checks. We have conducted two additional validity checks. The first check is 
related to the house price results. One might worry that the small merged municipalities are in 
a different business cycle compared to their larger partners, and this might have impacts also 
on local public jobs employment and house prices. We address this issue by analyzing the 
number of other jobs in the municipalities, defined as all jobs minus the job categories 
analyzed in Fig. 3 and Table 4. These jobs, although they may include some municipal jobs, 
can be seen as a placebo outcome in the sense that merging should not have a direct effect on 
them. According to Fig. A2 in supporting information, nothing happened to these jobs in any 
of the representation subgroups or in the control group and its subgroups. This result adds 
credibility to our results as it suggests that the different-sized merged municipalities are in the 
same business cycle, at least when it comes to the labor market outcomes.  
The second validity check addresses the interpretation of the results. The results so far 
suggest that representation in the post-merger council is an important driver of what happens 
to local services after the merger. However, it is not the only explanation that is consistent 
with these findings. One alternative explanation is that it simply makes sense to concentrate 
some services to larger municipalities and shutdown facilities in smaller places. Under this 
interpretation, the effects would still be due to merging, but they would not be related to 
political representation per se.  
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We test this alternative by estimating a model where we include the pre-merger 
population level of the municipality (the 2007 population) as an additional treatment variable 
in the DID regression. If the results are not driven by representation, but instead by municipal 
size, the population treatment should capture the effects and we should observe a zero effect 
for the seat share treatment.  
 The results from these models are presented in Table A6 in the supporting information. 
The pre-merger population level of the municipality is correlated (0.58) with the post-merger 
council seat share, but nonetheless we are able to identify both of these effects fairly 
precisely. There is identifying variation in seat shares over and above population levels 
because seat shares are more related to the relative size of the municipality in the merger 
rather than absolute size of the municipality. The results suggest that the post-merger council 
seat share is driving the results instead of population, although population has its own effect 
as well on administrative jobs.  
However, even with these additional results, we cannot claim to have a bullet proof 
identification strategy with respect to political representation. One possibility would be to 
follow Hyytinen et al. (2017) and use close elections for identification. However, we do not 
have enough close races in the merged municipalities to exploit them in this paper. 
 
5 Conclusions 
We have analyzed the effects of municipal mergers using novel geocoded data on 
municipal services and local politicians place of residence. Our results suggest that the 
mergers had practically no effects on total expenditures. This result is in line with previous 
research that shows that voluntary mergers are unlikely to result in cost savings. However, 
these aggregate effects hide interesting patterns within the mergers indicating that the benefits 
and costs of merging are distributed unevenly within the mergers. The municipalities who 
were politically marginalized in the post-merger council experienced a substantial reduction 
in local public jobs in administration and, more importantly, in health and social care sectors 
in their area relative to the municipalities with stronger representation. Furthermore, analysis 
of house price development provides suggestive evidence that this political marginalization 
was harmful to the residents of these small municipalities.  
Our results speak to the literatures that have examined the effects of redrawing 
jurisdictional boundaries and the effects of representation, and also inform the policy debate 
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on the effects of merging local jurisdictions. Compared to prior literature on the effects of 
municipal mergers, our results give a much more nuanced picture of what happens to 
municipal services and how these effects are tied to the political representation at the local 
level. The increased regional inequality that we document cannot be detected by simply 
comparing merged and non-merged municipalities meaning that the prior literature misses an 
important aspect of merger reforms. As better spatial data become more broadly available, 
analyzing the within merger effects in other countries with the methodological refinements 
introduced in this paper seems like a fruitful avenue for further research.  
It seems plausible that our results generalize at least to countries with a similar political 
system and public services at the local level. Furthermore, considering the extent of the 
literature from many different countries and political systems concerning the relationship 
between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of public funds, we 
think that the effects documented in this paper are not confined to Finland.  
At the same time, the details of the political system may affect how unequal the 
geographic representation becomes after a merger reform, and thus, the subsequent effects on 
service availability within the merged municipalities. The key features of election systems, 
such as ballot type, election formula, and district number and magnitude, are all likely to 
affect the resulting representation in subtle ways as they shape the incentives and actions of 
all political actors (Duverger 1954 and Taagepera and Shugart 1989).  
In addition to pointing out new directions in how to evaluate merger reforms, our results 
suggest that political efficacy and representation issues should feature more prominently in 
the planning stages of merger reforms. These reforms are often unpopular among the 
electorate and our results together with those by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) indicate that 
concerns for deteriorating local democracy and representation have merit. Our study shows 
that if major merger reforms are planned without putting local political representation at the 
center stage of the analysis, there may be unanticipated and undesired outcomes on regional 
equality.  
In addition to paying attention to how the prevalent electoral system influences the 
effects of mergers, policy-makers should consider whether there is a need to adjust the 
electoral system when municipal borders are redrawn. The lessons from the extensive 
literature on redistricting (e.g. Gelman and King 1994 and Coate and Knight 2007) should 
provide a useful starting point also for the planning of merger reforms and future research. 
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Supporting Information.  
 
Table A1. Number of hypothetical, matched and actual mergers by merger size.  
Number of 
municipalities Hypothetical mergers Matched controls Actual mergers 
2 277 70 14 
3 432 35 7 
4 687 20 4 
5 1,090 5 1 
6 1,643 10 2 
10 3,836 5 1 
Total 7,965 145 29 
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Table A2. Tests for pre-treatment common trends for expenditures, operating margin, tax rate 
and house prices with merger level data. 
  Expenditures
Operating 
margin Tax rate House price 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Constant 3322** -2669.32** 18.32** 6.750** 
  [30.18] [18.05] [0.055] [0.016]    
Merger 30.36 24.62 0.897** 0.356** 
  [73.62] [55.68] [0.048] [0.011]    
Merger * 2001 32.83* -26.58 -0.012 0.017 
  [15.11] [14.66] [0.029] [0.012]    
Merger * 2002 56.93* -32.61 -0.053 0.002 
  [22.47] [17.78] [0.049] [0.014]    
Merger * 2003 27.2 -24.52 0.026 -0.01 
  [26.44] [19.69] [0.060] [0.014]    
Merger * 2004 28.81 -16.74 0.005 -0.012 
  [34.77] [22.64] [0.070] [0.018]    
Merger * 2005 74.71 -30.41 0.11 0.004 
  [42.00] [27.54] [0.090] [0.023]    
Merger * 2006 75.5 -34.26 0.188* 0.013 
  [47.56] [31.95] [0.089] [0.022]    
Merger * 2007 78.2 -38.75 0.116 0.01 
  [51.69] [32.24] [0.091] [0.025]    
Merger * 2008 128.20* -79.62* 0.121 0.019 
  [59.13] [35.01] [0.111] [0.026]    
R2 0.68 0.77 0.26 0.27 
N  1566 1566 1566 1431 
Notes: The results are from OLS models and correspond to the results in Table 3 in the main text. The data are 
from 2000–2008. The non-merged control group is constructed using nearest neighbor matching algorithm. All 
the models include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the merger level and reported in brackets. ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A3. Tests for pre-treatment common trends for number of jobs per capita with pre-
merger municipality level data. 
  Administration Schooling 
Health and 
social care 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Constant -0.000 0.001 0.005 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.007]    
Merger 0.009** 0.013** 0.026** 
  [0.002] [0.003] [0.006]    
Seat share 0.011** 0.020** 0.037** 
  [0.002] [0.004] [0.007]    
Merger*2003 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]    
Merger*2005 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]    
Merger*2007 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]    
Seat share*2003 0.002 0.004 -0.001 
  [0.001] [0.003] [0.003]    
Seat share*2005 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]    
Seat share*2007 0.001 0.002 0.003 
  [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]    
R2 0.03 0.08 0.08 
N  2208 2208 2208 
Notes: The results are from OLS models and correspond to the results in Table 4 in the main text. The data are 
from 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2007. The non-merged control group is constructed using nearest neighbor matching 
algorithm All the models include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the merger and municipality 
level and reported in brackets. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A4. Regression DID results for house prices with pre-merger municipality level data. 
  House prices   House prices 
  [1]   [2] 
Constant 6.500** Constant 6.683** 
  [0.089]      [0.041]    
Merger 0.166*      
  [0.068]        
Seat share 0.253** Population share 0.210*  
  [0.084]      [0.085]    
Merger * 2009 -0.012     
  [0.020]        
Merger * 2010 -0.031     
  [0.026]        
Merger * 2011 -0.002     
  [0.032]        
Merger * 2012 -0.03     
  [0.040]        
Merger * 2013 -0.082       
  [0.050]        
Merger * 2014 -0.112*      
  [0.053]        
Seat share*2009 0.067*  Population share*2009 0.023 
  [0.032]      [0.038]    
Seat share*2010 0.089*  Population share*2010 0.022 
  [0.037]      [0.032]    
Seat share*2011 0.057 Population share*2011 0.039 
  [0.046]      [0.031]    
Seat share*2012 0.093   Population share*2012 0.055 
  [0.056]      [0.037]    
Seat share*2013 0.150*  Population share*2013 -0.023 
  [0.063]      [0.055]    
Seat share*2014 0.206** Population share*2014 0.108   
  [0.066]      [0.065]    
R2 0.34   0.35 
N  4365   3750 
Notes: The results are from OLS models and correspond to Fig. 4 in the main text. The non-merged control 
group is based on nearest neighbor matching algorithm All the models include year dummies. Standard errors are 
clustered at the merger and municipality level and reported in brackets. ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A5. Tests for pre-treatment common trends for house prices with pre-merger 
municipality level data. 
  House prices   House prices 
  [1]   [2] 
Constant 6.526** Constant 6.679** 
  [0.077]      [0.039]    
Merger 0.148**     
  [0.056]        
Seat share 0.228** Population share 0.221** 
  [0.071]      [0.072]    
Merger * 2001 0.012     
  [0.015]        
Merger * 2002 -0.013     
  [0.011]        
Merger * 2003 0.002     
  [0.016]        
Merger * 2004 0.006     
  [0.020]        
Merger * 2005 -0.017     
  [0.022]        
Merger * 2006 -0.017     
  [0.026]        
Merger * 2007 -0.018     
  [0.031]        
Merger * 2008 -0.019     
  [0.031]        
Seat share * 2001 0.008 Population share * 2001 -0.001 
  [0.024]      [0.016]    
Seat share * 2002 0.039*  Population share * 2002 0.002 
  [0.018]      [0.021]    
Seat share * 2003 0.001 Population share * 2003 -0.017 
  [0.026]      [0.036]    
Seat share * 2004 0 Population share * 2004 -0.019 
  [0.032]      [0.039]    
Seat share * 2005 0.047 Population share * 2005 -0.027 
  [0.035]      [0.043]    
Seat share * 2006 0.052 Population share * 2006 0.005 
  [0.040]      [0.052]    
Seat share * 2007 0.043 Population share * 2007 -0.012 
  [0.046]      [0.056]    
Seat share * 2008 0.038 Population share * 2008 -0.025 
  [0.048]      [0.058]    
R2 0.27   0.29 
N  2619   2250 
Notes: The results are from OLS models and correspond to Fig. 4 in the main text and Table A4. The data are 
from 2000–2008. The non-merged control group is based on nearest neighbor matching algorithm All the models 
include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the merger and municipality level and reported in 
brackets. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A6. Alternative regression results for number of jobs with pre-merger municipality 
level data. 
  Administration Schooling 
Health and 
social care 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Constant 0.006 0.011** 0.021** 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.007] 
Merger 0.004 0.002 0.012 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] 
Seat share 0.005 0.010** 0.021** 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.007] 
Population 0.002* 0.003** 0.004** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Merger*2009 -0.009** -0.007** -0.016** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
Merger*2010 -0.008** -0.001 -0.011** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Merger*2012 -0.008** -0.002 -0.013** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
Merger*2014 -0.008** -0.002 -0.011** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] 
Seat share*2009 0.008* 0.005 0.024** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] 
Seat share*2010 0.009** 0 0.014* 
  [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] 
Seat share*2012 0.011** 0.003 0.021** 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] 
Seat share*2014 0.009* 0.003 0.022** 
  [0.004] [0.002] [0.008] 
Population*2009 0.003* 0.002* 0.004 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Population*2010 0.003* 0.001 0.004* 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Population*2012 0.003* 0.001 0.003 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Population*2014 0.003* 0.001 0.003 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
R2 0.05 0.1 0.13 
N  4400 4400 4400 
Notes: The results are from OLS models. The non-merged control group is based on nearest neighbor matching 
algorithm All the models include year dummies. Population refers to municipal population in 2007. Standard 
errors are clustered at the merger and municipality level and reported in brackets. ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
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Fig. A1. Population with pre-merger municipality level data. 
Notes: The left-hand side figures illustrate the true treatment effects based on municipal seat shares in the post-
merger councils. The right-hand side figures illustrate the placebo treatments for the non-merged control group 
based on municipal population shares. The non-merged control group is based on nearest neighbor matching 
algorithm.  
 
 
  
Fig. A2. Number of jobs in all other sectors with pre-merger municipality level data. 
Notes: The left-hand side figures illustrate the true treatment effects based on municipal seat shares in the post-
merger councils. The right-hand side figures illustrate the placebo treatments for the non-merged control group 
based on municipal population shares. The non-merged control group is based on nearest neighbor matching 
algorithm. 
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